基于行政垄断的租值耗散程度测度及治理研究——以收费公路行业为例  

Estimation of Rant Dissipation based on Administrative Monopoly in Toll Road Industry and Corresponding Eliminating Strategies

作　　者：徐海成[1] 白鹏锐[1] 王建康[1] 

机构地区：[1]长安大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710064

出　　处：《经济问题》2016年第12期30-36,共7页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"收费公路行业行政垄断的租值耗散研究"(13BJY123)阶段性成果

摘　　要：基于收费公路行业特性和寻租均衡理论,从寻租行为角度构建了三阶段的行业行政垄断所致租值耗散测度模型,通过对模型中行政垄断的租值构成及相关参数的分析,实证测度了收费公路行业租值耗散程度并对结果及成因加以探讨,进而从重塑规制职能和构建双重监管体系两方面提出减少行政垄断、降低租值耗散的改革路径。Based on the characteristics of toll road industry and theory of rent seeking equilibrium, this paper firstly builds the model of three stages estimating rent dissipation of administrative monopoly according to seeking rant, and then analyzes and determines the composition of rent value caused by administrative monopoly and the pa- rameters of expression of the model. Finally quantificationally estimates the level of rent dissipation in toll road in- dustry by the model, then discusses the result and cause. Based on the above analysis, the paper eventually gives advise to reduce administrative monopoly and rent dissipation from remodeling regulation functions and building market ＆ government dual supervision system.

关 键 词：收费公路 行政垄断 租值耗散 测度 

分 类 号：F5[经济管理—产业经济]