公共文化服务设施补偿机制的演化博弈分析  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Cultural Service Facilities Compensation Mechanism

作　　者：吴正泓[1] 陈通[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2016年第11期169-173,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272148;71271152);教育部高校博士点基金项目(20120032110039)

摘　　要：弱经济性导致社会资本投资公共文化服务设施意愿低,政府需要进行适当的补偿以吸引社会资本参与。文章提出了市场式补偿和行政式补偿两种机制,通过构建演化博弈模型,研究公共文化服务设施项目政府补偿机制决策问题。研究结果表明:当目标需求大于临界值时,市场式补偿机制会成为公共部门占优策略,当目标需求小于临界值时,行政式补偿机制会成为公共部门占优策略;当私人部门采取机会主义的超额收益小于政府惩罚额时,私人部门会选择互惠主义,补偿机制能够顺利实施;项目需求对价格越敏感,公共部门越倾向于选择市场式补偿机制。研究结果为政府确定科学的补偿机制提供决策支持。Because the weak economy brings about that social capital is reluctant to invest in public cultural service facilities,thegovernment needs appropriate compensation to attract social capital to participate in. Market-style and administrative-stylecompensation mechanisms are presented in this paper. The compensation mechanism decision-making problem of public culturalservice facilities projects is studied by constructing the evolutionary game model. The results show that：Firstly,when the targetdemand is greater than the critical value,market-style compensation mechanism will become the dominant strategy in the publicsector;When the target demand is less than the critical value,administrative-style compensation mechanism will be the dominantstrategy. Secondly,when the excess return of opportunist behavior is less than the amount of government punishment,the privatesector will choose reciprocity and the compensation mechanism will be implemented smoothly. Thirdly,the more sensitive the projectrequirements are to price,the more the public sector will choose the market-style compensation mechanism. The results providescientific decision support for the government to choose the compensation mechanism.

关 键 词：公共文化 服务设施 补偿 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]