去产能政策的激励相容安排与系统风险防范  

Incentive Compatibility Arrangement and Systemic Risk Prevention of the De-Capacity Policy

作　　者：翁洪服[1] 林俊山[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行临沂市中心支行,山东临沂276000 [2]中国人民银行济南分行,山东济南250021

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2016年第11期76-80,共5页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘　　要：本文通过分析L市去产能过程中政府、企业互动博弈的案例,发现激励相容的政策可以让政府目标与企业家精神得到一定程度的统一。政府应该明确管理者和服务者的定位,对企业家精神要尊重,对违法行为要严厉,更好地发挥市场机制优胜劣汰的作用,更好地发挥政府管理服务的作用,让法律、市场倒逼机制在去产能促进产业结构优化升级中发挥更大作用。另外,政府应该通过激励相容的政策安排抑制系统性风险累积,要有序可控地释放去产能过程中的金融风险,防范系统风险传染扩散。Through the case of the reciprocal game between the government and enterprises in the de-capacity of L city, this paper finds that the policy of incentive compatibility can unify the government goal and the entrepreneurship to some extent. The government should make clear its position as the administrator and civil servant, show respect for the entrepreneurship, and give full play to the role of the law and market forcing mechanism in promoting the industrial structure upgrading. In addition, the government should restrain the accumulation of systemic risk through the policy arrangement of incentive compatibility, orderly and controllably release the financial risk in the process of de-capacity, and prevent the spread of systemic risk.

关 键 词：去产能 纳什均衡 激励相容 金融风险 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]