基于两阶段价格博弈的双边平台两部收费研究  

Two-part Tariff of Two-sided Platforms Based on Two-stage Pricing Games

作　　者：邹佳[1] 郭立宏[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054 [2]西北大学经济与管理学院,西安710127

出　　处：《软科学》2016年第12期115-119,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172201);陕西省社会科学基金项目(107-221450)

摘　　要：通过两阶段价格博弈模型和约束最优化方法,对双边平台的两部收费进行研究,得出Hotelling竞争市场中平台的均衡价格和利润,并与两种非两部收费的利润进行了比较。研究表明:当Hotelling竞争市场中的平台对两种价格的竞争博弈分两阶段各自单独进行时,两部收费带来的均衡利润是唯一的,而且此时两部收费的利润一定高于只一次性收取固定的费用时的利润,但有可能高于也有可能低于只对每笔交易收费时的利润;当平台在市场的一边具有排他性而在另一边不能排他时,价格会倾向于优惠不能排他的那一边的用户。This paper studies on the two-part tariff in two-sided market based on two-stages pricing games models and constrained optimization method,and finds out that the equilibrium prices and profits and compares the profits with that of the two kinds of one-part tariff. Results show that,the equilibrium profits of two-part tariff are unique and higher than that of pure lump-sum fees and higher or lower than that of the pure per-transaction fees if the competition games of the two kinds of prices are individually played by two stages in Hotelling competition market. The platforms prefers to provide the users in non-exclusive side with privilege of prices when platforms are excludability in one side and non-excludability in the other side.

关 键 词：HOTELLING模型 两部收费 两阶段价格博弈 多归属 约束最优化 

分 类 号：F014.3[经济管理—政治经济学] F031.4