机构投资者持股、大股东控制与持续经营审计意见  

Institutional Investors Holdings,Control of the Largest Shareholder and Going-concern Opinions

作　　者：李传宪[1] 黄雅宁[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学管理学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《商业研究》2016年第12期110-117,131,共9页Commercial Research

摘　　要：基于我国沪深A股上市公司2008-2014年的数据,本文运用Logistic回归方法分析我国机构投资者持股与上市公司被出具持续经营审计意见之间的关系,并依据我国上市公司大股东控制和国有控股的现状,分组检验大股东控制与国有控股对这两者之间关系的影响。研究结果表明:机构投资者持股比例越高,上市公司被出具持续经营审计意见的概率越小。这种现象只在大股东非绝对控制和非国有控股的上市公司中存在,这表明大股东控制和国有控股抑制了机构投资者对公司持续经营能力的治理作用。Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2008 to 2014, this paper analyzes the relationship between institutional investors holdings and the probability of the listed company being is- sued a going-concern opinion by Logistic Regression method, and tests the effect of the largest shareholder＇s control and the state-owned controlling on the relationship between institutional investors holdings and going-concern opinions by group testing considering the reality of the largest shareholder＇s control and the state-owned controlling of Chinese listed companies. The re- sults show that the higher proportion of stock held by the institutional investors, the lower probability of the listed company be- ing issued a going-concern opinion, and this phenomenon only exists in the non-absolute control of the largest shareholder and the non-state owned controlling sample, which shows that the control of the largest shareholder and the state-owned controlling restrain the governance role of institutional investors on the ability of sustainable management.

关 键 词：机构投资者持股 持续经营 大股东控制 国有控股 

分 类 号：F239.1[经济管理—会计学]