PPP模式运营期内公私部门合作机制的演化分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coordination Mechanism for Operation Period in Public-private Partnerships Projects

作　　者：朱建波[1] 时茜茜[1] 盛昭瀚[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2016年第24期218-224,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重大项目"我国重大基础设施工程管理的理论;方法与应用创新研究"(71390520);国家自然科学基金资助项目"基于情景计算机模拟的重大工程组织;流程与战略资源协同研究"(71271107);国家自然科学基金资助项目"工程施工团队中机会主义行为机理;演化与防范策略研究"(71301062);国家自然科学基金资助项目"重大基础设施工程的组织公民行为形成机理;动态演化及治理策略研究"(71571098);国家自然科学基金资助项目"利益相关者互动情景下企业环境行为机理;演化与联合治理策略"(71501084);江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目"基于公平偏好的重大工程承包商合作机制研究"(KYZZ15_0023);江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目"重大工程决策组织动力学分析及结构优化研究"(KYLX15_0031)

摘　　要：为研究PPP模式下项目运营期内的公私合作问题,以有限理性为前提基于演化视角建立双方的博弈模型,探讨演化稳定策略的影响因素。研究结果表明,政府部门应关注收益分配的平衡对于合作的影响,避免补贴机制失效;在一定情形下,私人部门成本的降低、超额收益的增加、政府监管成本的上升均可使双方走向合作,超额收益存在一个最优分配系数,可促成双方达成良好的协同关系;合理的惩罚机制的设置,也可以促进双方的合作。For the study of public - private cooperation mechanism in operation period of PPP projects, given the bounded rationality of government and the private sector, a public - private cooperation evolution model was established. By using this model, the mechanism of interaction between them. income distribution, incentive and supervision, cooperation cost and other factors affecting the evolution stability of the system were analyzed. The results show that the government should balance the excess income distribution to avoid the failure of supervision and incentive mechanism; the decrease of private cost and increase of excess income and supervision cost have a positive correlation with the cooperation of both sides ; there is an optimal proportion of excess income allocation, which makes a win - win co - operation of both sides ; a reasonable punishment mechanism can also promote bilateral cooperation.

关 键 词：PPP模式 合作机制 收益分配 运营期 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]