消费者质量识别对农产品供应链质量和价格决策的影响  

The Impact of Consumers' Quality Identification on the Decisions of Quality and Price in an Agricultural Product Supply Chain

作　　者：古川[1] 罗峦[1] Gu Chuan Luo Luan(Economics College, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410128)

机构地区：[1]湖南农业大学经济学院,长沙410128

出　　处：《管理评论》2016年第12期225-234,共10页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71403087);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2016M590743);湖南省自然科学基金青年项目(2015JJ3078);湖南省哲学社会科学基金一般项目(13YBA166;14YBA194);湖南农业大学引进人才科学基金(13YJ06)

摘　　要：消费者对农产品质量的识别会影响农业企业的经营决策。本文把农产品市场假设为质量不能被识别和能够被识别的两种情况,应用Stackelberg博弈模型讨论了供应链的质量投入和产品定价,研究表明:质量不能被识别时,质量投入和产品价格受到价格弹性影响,价格敏感时可能形成低质低价的局面;质量可被识别时,质量和定价都随质量识别能力提高而增加,且生产商主导时质量投入和价格较高,而集成决策企业会根据市场规模进行质量投入,此时有益于形成高质高价的良性局面。Consumer＇ s perception of the quality of agricultural products in the market will influence the strategies of the upstream enter- prises. In this paper, the market is assumed to be under two opposite conditions： one is that agricultural product quality is identifiable and the other unidentifiable. The agricultural products supply chain is divided into three structures depending on the dominant firms and Stackelberg Game Model is used to discuss quality investment and product price. The research reveals that when quality is unidentifiable, the quality investment and product price of the supply chain are affected by the market price elasticity; when quality is identifiable, the quality investment and product price of the supply chain increase with the increase of the quality identification capability, and quality in- vestment and price are relatively high in the producer-driven supply chain, but the integrated decision-making enterprises will make some certain quality investment after careful selection, which can contribute to a benign development of high quality and high price.

关 键 词：质量识别 农产品供应链 质量投入 价格制定 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F323.7[经济管理—产业经济]