间接互惠下公共文化PPP项目机会主义行为  

Opportunistic Behaviors of Public Cultural PPP Projects based on Indirect Reciprocity

作　　者：吴正泓[1] 陈通[1] 张保银[1] WU Zhenghong CHEN Tong ZHANG Baoyin(College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, Chin)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第6期80-84,共5页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272148);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271152);教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20120032110039)

摘　　要：引入间接互惠机制,通过构建演化博弈模型,分析公共文化PPP项目中公私部门决策过程,研究机会主义行为产生的原因和应对机制。研究结果表明:私人部门当期机会主义收益的大小是影响机会主义行为产生的关键因素;严厉的惩罚机制并不能有效遏制机会主义行为;未来合作收益和声誉系数越大,私人部门越倾向于采取互惠主义行为,实现公私部门合作的帕累托最优。基于上述结论,提出政府部门应出台激励政策扩大PPP市场规模,并建立惩罚机制及声誉机制,有效防范公共文化PPP项目中的机会主义行为。Indirect reciprocity mechanism is attempted to introduced to analyze decision-making process of public and private sectors ,and study the causes and coping mechanisms of opportunistic behaviors ,based on evolutionary game model in this paper. The results show that the earnings of opportunistic behavior is the key factor to result in opportunistic behaviors, based on indirect reciprocity. The punishment mechanism can＇t prevent opportunistic behaviors; The greater future cooperation earnings and the reputation coefficient are,the more the private sector tend to take reciprocity behavior,which result in Pareto optimal. Based on the above findings, the government is suggested to propose the incentive policy to expand the PPP market, and to establish the reputation and punishment mechanism to prevent opportunistic behaviors.

关 键 词：公共文化 PPP项目 机会主义行为 间接互惠 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F282[经济管理—国民经济]