基层央行领导干部离任经济责任审计研究  

作　　者：张思莲 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行赣州市中心支行

出　　处：《企业经济》2016年第12期182-186,共5页Enterprise Economy

摘　　要：在基层央行开展离任经济责任审计,既是对领导干部监督管理的需要,也是深入推进反腐败工作的需要。2013年,新修订的《中国人民银行领导干部离任审计制度》进一步明确了人民银行领导干部离任审计的原则、内容、程序等,为各级审计部门开展离任经济责任审计提供了制度依据和操作规范,但是,从目前离任经济责任审计实施现状来看,制度执行与制度要求还有较大差距,影响了离任经济责任审计的效果。本文就基层央行离任经济责任审计的必要性及应把握的要点进行论述,对审计实践中存在的问题进行剖析,对完善离任经济责任审计提出了针对性的对策建议。It is necessary to launch term-end accountability audits for the branches of People＇s Bank of China, because it is not only to supervise the officials, but also to strengthen the efforts to combat corruption. The Regulations to Audit Term-end Offi- cials were enacted in 2013, which defined the principals, contents and procedures to audit the term-end officials and set foundations and regulations for auditing department to charge the audit of economic accountability. In terms of the imple- mentation of the term-end accountability, there is still a large gap between the implementation and the regulation, so that it influences the effect of term-end accountability audit. This article aims to illustrate the necessity of term-end accountabili- ty audit and the key points during the implementation process, analyzes the problems and causes by showing examples, and gives some suggestions to perfect term-end accountability audit.

关 键 词：基层央行 领导干部 经济责任审计 问题研究 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]