道德风险和逆向选择共存下的双向激励契约  

Bilateral incentive contract with both moral hazard and adverse selection

作　　者：程红[1] 汪贤裕[2] 郭红梅[2] 黄梅萍[3] 

机构地区：[1]成都理工大学管理科学学院,成都610059 [2]四川大学商学院,成都610065 [3]福州大学土木工程学院,福州350108

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第12期36-46,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(14YJC630020;13YJC630053;13XJC630014);成都理工大学优秀科研团队资助项目(KYTD201406)

摘　　要：道德风险和逆向选择的共存降低了供应链的效率.因此,针对核心企业缺失的供应链,根据供应链企业竞争与合作的特点,从虚拟第三方的角度建立模型解决该问题.考虑制造商有关于产品成本的私人信息,销售商有关于销售努力的私人信息,结合数量折扣契约和AGV机制的思想,建立双向激励模型,以实现对供应链企业的激励和协调.结果表明,恰当设置利润调整参数可使该契约满足预算平衡约束、激励约束和个体理性约束,且能够实现一体化供应链的交易量,即该契约能对核心企业缺失下供应链中同时存在道德风险和逆向选择的问题进行激励和协调.最后,用数值算例验证了理论结论.The coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection has limited the supply chain＇ s efficiency. A model is developed from the virtual-third party＇ s perspective for supply chains without core enterprises, based on the cooperation and competition among enterprises. Considering that the retailer has private information a- bout his effort and that the manufacturer has private information about his cost, a bilateral incentive model is built to achieve both the incentive and coordination by using a quantity discount contract and AGV （ d＇ Aspre- mont and Gerard-Varet） mechanism. The result shows that three constraints （the balance, the incentive and the individual rationality constraint） could be satisfied and a steady transaction quantity in an integrated supply chain could be achieved by properly setting the parameter of profit adjustment. In other words, the contract proved in the paper can realize bilateral incentive and coordination simultaneously. At last, a numerical exam- ple is presented to assess the theory conclusions.

关 键 词：双向激励 道德风险 逆向选择 虚拟第三方 AGV机制 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]