网络借贷中借款人道德风险行为分析及规制策略  

Regulation Strategies for Moral Hazard Behaviors from Borrowers in Peer-To-Peer Lending

作　　者：伏红勇[1] 高华丽[1] FU Hong - yong GAO Hua - li(School of Management, Southwest University of Political Science ＆ Law, Chongqing 401120, China)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学,重庆401120

出　　处：《西南政法大学学报》2016年第6期103-109,共7页Journal of Southwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"‘互联网+’农产品订单质押融资模式创新及风险防范机制研究"(16BGL002);教育部人文社科基金项目"‘公司+农户’模式下考虑天气影响的农产品供应链协调机制研究"(14YJC630034);"基于供应链金融的农产品质押融资风险预警及应急机制研究"(14YJC630152);中国博士后科学基金项目"天气影响下基于CVaR的‘公司+农户’型订单合同研究"(2015M580770);重庆市博士后科研项目"互联网时代订单农业模式创新与风险管理研究"(Xm2015044)

摘　　要：网络借贷作为最能体现互联网金融精神的一种新型金融组织形式,在解决跨地域、跨时空的小微企业以及个人融资难题上发挥了重要作用。网络借贷在通过现代信息技术手段解决民间融资难题的同时,也不可避免地面临着难以监控的道德风险,随着《网络借贷信息中介机构业务活动管理暂行办法》的出台,网络借贷平台的道德风险行为势必会得到一定程度的抑制,然而对于借款人的道德风险违约行为,依然存在着规制空白。由此,如何规避拥有绝对信息优势且缺乏抵押担保资产借款人的道德风险行为成为亟待解决的关键科学问题。Peer - to - peer lending is an innovative financial moedl that embodys the spirit of internet finance. It plays an important role in solving the financing difficulty for both small and micro businesses and individuals, which are from different areas. Although peer- to -peer lending solves the financing problem by modern information technology, the platforms inevitably encounter the moral hazard behaviors. Tanks to the Interim Measures to Information Intermediaries of Peer - to - Peer Lending, moral hazard behaviors of the platforms are bound to be hindered. However, moral hazard behaviors of borrowers still exist. Thus, it is a critical scientific issues to regulate the moral hazard behaviors of borrowers who have the priority of information and lack the mortgage -backed asset.

关 键 词：网络借贷 道德风险行为 规制策略 大数据征信 O2O信用认证 行为监管 

分 类 号：DF438[政治法律—经济法学]