中国电煤绿色供应链协调的机制设计及路径选择  

Coordination mechanism design and path selection of China power-coal green supply chain

作　　者：李巍巍[1] 吴冲[2] LI Weiwei WU Chong(School of Management, Heilongjiang Univercity of Science ＆ Technology, Harbin 150022, China School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China)

机构地区：[1]黑龙江科技大学管理学院,哈尔滨150022 [2]哈尔滨工业大学经济管理学院,哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《黑龙江科技大学学报》2016年第3期345-350,共6页Journal of Heilongjiang University of Science And Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71271070)

摘　　要：为促进建立新型的煤电行业关系,利用进化博弈的种群博弈理论,研究煤炭企业、电力企业、政府三方的博弈演化过程及影响因素。研究表明:电煤绿色供应链演化受政府管制有效与否的影响,受电煤绿色供应链的合作成本、合作收益、收益分配系数、合作风险减少额、风险补偿系数等因素的影响。所给出的绿色供应链合作利益分配系数及对违约方的惩罚系数设定的合理区间,为政府实施有效监管给出了政策性建议。This paper is aimed at a faster development of a new-type relationship between coal and electricity industry.The study building on the population game theory of evolutionary game works towards the revolution process and corresponding influence factors of the game among the three parties,such as coal enterprises,power enterprises,and the government.The research proves that the evolution of green supply chain between coal and electricity industry is determined by such factors as the effective performance of government regulation,cooperation cost,cooperation profit,cooperation income distribution coefficient,cooperation risk reduction and risk compensation coefficient associated with green supply chain between coal and electricity industry.These problems are addressed by providing the distribution coefficient of the cooperation interest（risk）,defining a reasonable range for penalty coefficient towards defaulting party on such supply chain,and offering policy recommendations on the way governments achieve an effective supervision.

关 键 词：电煤供应链 复制动态 进化稳定策略 进化博弈 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]