零利率约束下的货币联盟内部财政政策协调  

Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union under a Zero Bound on Interest Rate

作　　者：邢曙光[1,2] 黄梅波[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院 [2]北京大学经济研究所 [3]厦门大学经济学院

出　　处：《国际金融研究》2017年第1期49-58,共10页Studies of International Finance

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“援助有效性、发展有效性与中国对外援助的质量研究”(13BJL054);2011年度教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”(NECT-11-029);国家社科基金重大项目“‘一路一带’战略实施中推进人民币国际化问题研究”(15EDA017)资助

摘　　要：欧元区利率为零,货币政策受到限制,财政政策更加重要。参考Holden&Paetz(2012)的研究,本文将零利率约束引入两国新凯恩斯模型来研究货币联盟的财政政策协调。当本国遭受技术冲击时,如果政府可以接触金融市场,零利率约束下的本国政府支出缺口上升幅度增加,外国政府支出缺口下降幅度减少;否则,零利率约束下的本国政府支出缺口下降幅度增加,外国政府支出缺口上升幅度减少。零利率约束增加本国通货膨胀波动,减少外国通货膨胀波动,但对产出缺口的影响取决于财政约束条件。无论政府面临何种财政约束,零利率约束均将恶化本国福利,改善外国福利,整体上恶化货币联盟福利。The effect of monetary policy under zero interest rate in euro zone is limited, so fiscal policy is more important. Following Holden and Paetz （2012）, this paper introduces the zero bound on interest rate into a two-country New Keynesian model to study fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union. In the time of technology shock in domestic country, if the government can access to financial market, the growth range of domestic government spending under zero bound on interest rate increases and the growth range of foreign government spending decreases; otherwise, the growth range of the domestic decreases and that of the foreign government spending increases. Zero bound on interest rate increases the volatility of domestic inflation and decreases the volatility of foreign inflation, but how it affects output gaps depends on the fiscal constraints of governments. Whatever fiscal constraints governments face, zero bound on interest rate benefits domestic country less than foreign country and generally goes against of the whole monetary union.

关 键 词：货币联盟 零利率 财政政策协调 新凯恩斯模型 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]