吹哨者、公司、审计师的博弈分析——基于吹哨者保护制度的研究  

Game Analysis of Whistleblower,Company and Auditor:Research Based on the Whistleblower Protection System

作　　者：栾甫贵[1] 田丽媛[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2017年第1期38-48,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(16BGL069)

摘　　要：公司员工作为内部控制的参与者和执行者,对本公司的内部控制有着深入的了解。如果发现公司对其内部控制存在不实披露,公司员工是否扮演"吹哨者"的角色并进行揭发检举,会直接影响公司和审计师的行为。研究吹哨者保护制度的功效,通过建立单期不完全信息动态模型,对员工、公司和审计师三者之间的利益冲突进行博弈分析。研究表明,完善的吹哨者保护制度可以提升公司员工的吹哨意愿,减少外部审计的成本,同时减少公司对内控的不实披露。As participants and executors of internal control, company staff have a deep understanding of the internal control of the company. If they find that there exists a false disclosure in the internal control, whether the company staff play ther ole of ＂whistleblower＂ and expose such a fraud will directly influence the behavior of the company and the audit. This paper establi- shes a single phase of incomplete infoimation game models to analyze the conflict of interest among the staff, the company and the auditor. The results show that a good protection system of whistleblowers can increase the staff＇s willingness to blow his whistle, reduce the cost of external audit, as well as prevent the false disclosure of the company.

关 键 词：内部控制质量 吹哨者保护制度 审计成本 审计质量 审计意见 审计合谋 内部控制审计 审计风险 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]