基于演化博弈的劳资关系分析  

Analysis of Labor Relations Based on an Evolutionary Game

作　　者：曹铭[1] 张成科[2] 朱怀念[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]广东工业大学经济与贸易学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《系统科学学报》2016年第4期111-116,共6页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571053;11501129);广东省普通高校人文社会科学研究项目(11WYXM022);广东省自然科学基金项目(2014A030310366;2015A030310218);数学天元青年基金项目(11426069)

摘　　要：本文在学习和总结前人研究成果的基础上,建立了政府监管下的三群体2×2×2劳资关系演化博弈模型,给出了政府、劳方、资方的动态复制系统,分析了系统的演化过程,并探讨了不同参数条件下的演化稳定策略。最后,通过仿真分析发现,三群体最理想的稳定策略是劳资双方合作、政府部门不监管,此时,个体收益不是最优,但三群体总收益达到最大。On the basis of studying and summarizing previous research results from other researchers concerned, this paper is to establish a dynamic game pattern of three-population 2×2×2 relationship un- der government supervision, which can indicate the dynamic replication system of the government, employees and employers, and also, by analyzing the evolution process of the system, to explore the evolutionary stable strategy under different parameters. Finally, by simulation analysis, we can conclude that the most stable strategy is to establish cooperation between employers and employees while the government does not interfere, then although the individual gain is not the largest, the total profits for all these three-population will reach its maximization.

关 键 词：政府监管 劳资关系 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：N949[自然科学总论—系统科学]