基于Stackelberg博弈的异质品双渠道供应链定价策略  

Pricing Strategies of Dual-channel Product Supply Chain Based on Stackelberg Game

作　　者：周健[1] 陈露婷[1] 唐哲宇 

机构地区：[1]同济大学机械与能源工程学院,上海201804

出　　处：《同济大学学报（自然科学版）》2016年第12期1962-1968,共7页Journal of Tongji University:Natural Science

基　　金：上海市博士后基金(11R21416500)

摘　　要：为了有效解决异质品双渠道供应链的定价问题,研究了产品差异性对定价策略的影响.基于消费者剩余理论,构建了异质品双渠道供应链的定价决策模型.在此基础上,运用Stackelberg博弈求得异质品双渠道中零售商和制造商的最优定价以及零售商和制造商的最佳收益,并通过数值试验分析产品差异性对双渠道供应链各方以及整体定价策略和利润的影响.结果显示,采取高端产品的差异化战略对零售商、制造商以及供应链整体都有利.To effectively solve the problem of pricing strategies in dual-channel supply chain with heterogeneous product, the effect of product dissimilitude on pricing strategies was researched. Firstly, a pricing decision model of dual-channel heterogeneous product supply chain was built based on consumer surplus theory. Then Stackelberg game was applied to get the optimal pricing and profits of manufacture and retailer. Finally, the effect of product dissimilitude on pricing strategies and profits of manufacture, retailer and the whole supply chain was analyzed by numerical experiment. The results indicate that strategy of high-end product dissimilitude is benefit for manufacture, retailer and the whole supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 双渠道 异质品 定价 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：C931.1[经济管理—管理学]