基于动态博弈的媒体参与下网络舆情机制分析  

Analysis of Network Public Opinion Mechanism Based on Dynamic Game Theory and Media Participation

作　　者：张立凡[1] 程楠[1] 朱恒民[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学管理学院,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《情报科学》2017年第1期144-147,152,共5页Information Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71271120)

摘　　要：【目的/意义】如何理清网络舆情的传播机制,从而有效引导与管理网络行为,成为政府的重要任务。【方法/过程】针对媒体参与报道的网络舆情传播,建立了媒体与政府,网民与意见领袖的两类博弈模型,将考虑公平因素的收益函数引入博弈收益矩阵中。运用向前归纳法建立三阶段动态博弈,对媒体和意见领袖选择非子博弈完美均衡路径的具体条件进行分析,推导出收益变化率θ的阈值。【结果/结论】针对不同阈值条件下各方最优策略,给出政府应对和管理网络舆情的最优策略。【Purpose/significance】How to clarify the communication mechanism of network public opinion, so as to effec-tively guide and manage network behavior, become an important task of the government.【Method/process】Aiming at thespread of network public opinion with the media report participated, the paper establishes two game models of media andgovernment, Internet users and opinion leaders. The return function considering fairness factor is introduced into the gamepayoff matrix. The paper also applies forward induction to establish three stage dynamic game,and analyzes the specific con-ditions of media and opinion leaders choosing non sub game perfect equilibrium path. At last the threshold of yield changerate is given. 【Result/conclusion】Aiming at the optimal strategies under different threshold conditions, the optimal strategyfor government to deal with and manage network public opinion is given.

关 键 词：网络舆情 媒体参与 动态博弈 

分 类 号：G206.3[文化科学—传播学]