上市公司治理的监管模式选择——向“遵守或者解释”规则转变  

Choice of Supervision Mode of Listed Company Governance

作　　者：楼秋然[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学民商经济法学院,北京100088

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2017年第1期63-70,共8页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：2002年,美国通过强制性色彩浓厚的《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》,试图收紧对上市公司的治理监管。然而,强制性监管模式并不具有充分的正当性基础,其最重要的缺陷在于忽视了"好的公司治理因公司而易"的事实。任意性监管模式由于难以为投资者提供周全保护、可能导致公司治理的柠檬市场等缺陷,不能作为应对危机的监管模式。"遵守或者解释"规则因为兼具强制性与任意性监管模式的优点,体现出既能维持公司治理的必要弹性,又能有效保护投资者、降低代理成本的制度优势。未来我国上市公司治理监管应当完成向遵守或者解释规则的转向。After the outbreak of the economic crisis, there has been a heated debate on how to regulate the corporate governance. With the enactment of SOX act, the U.S has adopted a mandatory regulation mode. However, the foundation of such a mandatory mode is not solid. The fatal flaw of it is that it contradicts a fact that good corporate governance depends on the different situation. In addition, a purely enabling mode would lead to inadequate protection of investors and a lemon market of corporate governance. In contrast, the comply or explain mode could not only maintain the flexibility of corporate governance, but provide enough protection to investors and reduce agency costs as much as possible as well.

关 键 词：公司治理 强制性规范 任意性规范 遵守或者解释规则 

分 类 号：D922.28[政治法律—经济法学]