基于攻防演化博弈模型的防御策略选取方法  

Defense strategies selection based on attack-defense evolutionary game model

作　　者：黄健明[1,2] 张恒巍[1,2] 王晋东[1,2] 黄世锐 

机构地区：[1]信息工程大学,河南郑州450001 [2]数学工程与先进计算国家重点实验室,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《通信学报》2017年第1期168-176,共9页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.61303074;No.61309013);河南省科技计划基金资助项目(No.12210231003;No.13210231002)~~

摘　　要：当前运用博弈理论的网络安全研究方法大多采用完全理性假设,与实际情况并不相符。从网络攻防对抗的有限理性约束出发,基于非合作演化博弈理论,构建攻防演化博弈模型,提出演化稳定均衡的求解方法。在分析演化稳定策略的基础上,设计了最优防御策略选取算法。通过仿真实验验证了所提模型和方法的有效性,并且分析、总结了有限理性限制下攻防行为的演化规律。Due to that the current network security researches based on game theory mostly use the completely rationality assumption, which is not consistent with the facts. Under the bounded rationality constraint of network attack-defense, attack-defense evolutionary game model and a method to solve evolutionary stable equilibrium based on the non-cooperative evolutionary game theory was proposed. The optimal defense strategy selection algorithm was designed based on the analysis of the evolutionary stable strategy. The effectiveness of the model and method proposed is verified by simulation results, through which some evolution conclusions of offensive behavior on the premise of limited rational- ity were drawn.

关 键 词：网络攻防 有限理性 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 最优防御策略 

分 类 号：TP390[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]