两阶段技术采购中政府选择奖励方式的策略  

Strategy of Government Providing Rewards during Two-stage Technology Procurement

作　　者：海江涛[1] 仲伟俊[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学管理学院,南京210023 [2]东南大学经济管理学院,南京211189

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2017年第1期35-43,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2012BAH29F01);科技创新战略研究专项资助项目(ZLY2015108);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(15YJC630028);南京邮电大学引进人才科研基金资助项目(NYY214002)

摘　　要：政府部门从企业采购所需技术进行公共产品技术创新对提高整个社会的福利水平具有重要作用。考虑存在技术研发风险以及"干中学"效果的影响,研究了两阶段的技术采购过程中政府部门如何公布奖励信息,以及如何分配奖励额度的问题。研究认为,参与企业的学习能力较低时,两种奖励信息公布方式对政府部门无差别;随着参与企业的学习能力增加,当参与企业的员工初始相关工作经验比较缺乏时,政府部门应该分阶段公布奖励信息;参与企业的员工初始相关工作经验差别较大的情况下,政府部门一般都会选择第1阶段直接公布奖励信息的方式,并且政府部门一般都会选择将更多的奖励用在第2阶段。Technology procurement of the government for technology innovation of public goods greatly impacts on improving the social welfare. Considering the R＆D risk and the effect of ＂learn by doing＂, we study the technology procurement process of the government and analyze how the government reveals the information and distributes the reward. We show that if the learning ability of the enterprises is low, two distinct rewarding mechanisms have no difference. With the increase of the enterprises＇ learning ability, if the enterprises＇ initial work experience is weak, the governments should release bonus information in stages. If the initial experiences of employees are significantly different, the governments should generally choose in the first stage release the reward information directly and keep more rewards for the second stage.

关 键 词：公共产品技术创新 技术采购 研发风险 

分 类 号：G304[文化科学]