基于蛛网模型的WEEE处理补贴策略分析  

Cobweb Model-based Analysis of Government Subsidy Strategies for WEEE Recycling

作　　者：胡书[1] 马祖军[2] 代颖[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,成都610031 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院物流与应急管理研究所,成都610031

出　　处：《管理评论》2017年第1期240-249,共10页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71103149);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(16YJA630005);西南交通大学博士生创新基金项目(西交校研〔2015〕86号)

摘　　要：针对政府规制下由制造商、销售商、消费者、回收商和处理商构成的电器电子产品闭环供应链,分析了供应链中各主体的利润,并基于蛛网模型研究了政府与处理商之间的重复博弈过程,求得该博弈的均衡解。在此基础上分析了政府的WEEE处理补贴策略,结果表明:在处理商愿意响应WEEE处理补贴政策的前提下,政府降低对处理商实现的再生利用率的敏感程度或提高单位WEEE处理补贴上限,都能提高均衡状态下的WEEE再生利用率;若政府为了片面追求WEEE再生利用率最大化而不断提高处理补贴,将有损社会福利,且随着WEEE处理补贴的提高,社会福利损失也越大。The closed-loop supply chain for electrical and electronic equipments under government regulations is investigated. The supply chain consists of manufacturers,retailers,recyclers,collectors and consumers. The profits of each member in the supply chain are analyzed. The repeated game process between government and recycler is analyzed based on the Cobweb model and the equilibrium solution is obtained. On this basis,the government subsidy strategies for WEEE recycling are analyzed. The results show that if recyclers would like to abide by government regulations,the WEEE recycling rate in equilibrium can be enhanced by decreasing the sensitivity to the realized WEEE recycling rate or increasing the upper limit of government subsidy for WEEE recycling. However,if the government blindly seeks to maximize the WEEE recycling rate in equilibrium by increasing the government subsidy constantly,it will lead to a loss of social welfare,and the degree of loss will increase with the unit subsidy.

关 键 词：WEEE 政府补贴 闭环供应链 重复博弈 蛛网模型 

分 类 号：F426.6[经济管理—产业经济] F713.2F812.4