对PRINCE分组密码的不可能差分攻击  

Impossible differential cryptanalysis on the PRINCE

作　　者：魏悦川[1] 潘晓中[1] 戎宜生[2] 王绪安[1] 

机构地区：[1]武警工程大学电子技术系,陕西西安710086 [2]武警工程大学装备工程学院,陕西西安710086

出　　处：《西安电子科技大学学报》2017年第1期119-124,共6页Journal of Xidian University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61202492);信息保障技术重点实验室开放课题资助项目(KJ-15-010);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划资助项目(2016JQ6030)

摘　　要：PRINCE是一个具有64bit分组长度,128bit密钥的轻量级分组密码,具有低功耗、低延时等特点.不包含密钥白化的PRINCE密码被称为PRINCEcore.为评估其安全性,笔者对PRINCE密码的线性变换进行统计测试,给出了线性变换的统计特征,并利用"中间相错"的方法构造了PRINCE密码的5轮不可能差分区分器.利用该区分器,结合线性变换的性质,对9轮PRINCEcore进行不可能差分攻击,攻击的数据复杂度为261.2,计算复杂度为254.3,存储复杂度为217.7.测试结果表明,9轮PRINCEcore密码对于文中给出的攻击是不免疫的.The PRINCE is a light-weight block cipher with the 64-bit block size and 128-bit key size. It is characterized by low power-consumption and low latency. PRINCEcore is the PRINCE cipher without keywhiting. For evaluating its security, a statistical testing on linear transformation is performed, and a statistical character matrix is given. By using the ＂miss-in-the-middle＂ technique, we construct a 5-round impossible differential characteristic. Based on the 5-round distinguisher, a 9-round attack on the PRINCEcore is performed. For the 9-round attack, the data complexity, time complexity and space complexity are 2^61.2, 2^54.3 and 2^17.7, respectively. The testing result shows that the PRINCEcore reduced to 9 rounds is not immune to impossible differential attack.

关 键 词：分组密码 不可能差分攻击 PRINCE密码 攻击复杂度 

分 类 号：TN918[电子电信—通信与信息系统]