携号转网政策下中国电信业接入定价研究  

Research on Access Pricing of China Telecommunication Industry under the MNP Policy

作　　者：李美娟[1] 唐启明[2] LI Mei-juan TANG Qi-ming(School of Economics and Management Yunnan Normal University, Kunming Yunnan 650092 School of Foreign Language and Literature Yunnan Normal University, Kunming Yunnan 650092)

机构地区：[1]云南师范大学经济与管理学院,云南昆明650092 [2]云南师范大学外国语学院,云南昆明650092

出　　处：《价格月刊》2017年第1期19-23,共5页

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(编号:11CJY043)

摘　　要：中国电信业自2010年实施携号转网政策试点以来,取得的成效并不明显,这表明携号转网政策的实施尚不能改变中国移动"一家独大"格局,还要出台其他政策与之配套,例如接入定价规制政策。以移动-移动互联为例,研究中国电信业在携号转网政策下应如何进行接入定价,以优化电信业市场结构和提高市场竞争效率。研究得出:在携号转网政策下,当接入价格等于接入成本时,使得强势运营商的市场份额下降、利润减少,弱势运营商的市场份额增加、利润增加,最后达到均分市场的格局。因此,为了使中国电信业市场结构日趋均衡,在实施携号转网政策的同时,还应以接入价格等于接入成本的方法进行接入定价。Since China telecommunication industry carried out MNP policy experiment unit in 2010, the effect is not obvious, which indicates that MNP pohcy could not change the dominating pattern of China Mobile. It should also introduce other suited policy, such as access pricing regulation policy. Taken mobile-mobile interconnection as example, this article studies how to take access pricing under the MNP pohcy for China telecommunication industry to optimize the market structure and increase market competition efficiency. The result shows： under the MNP policy, when the access price is equal to access cost, the market share of powerful operator decreases, and the profit reduces, while the market share of weak operators and the profit increases, and the egalitarian market pattern has been achieved eventually. Therefore, in order to balance the market structure, the access pricing by access price equal to access cost should be introduced as well as MNP implementation.

关 键 词：携号转网 接入定价 转移成本 接入成本 

分 类 号：F726.2[经济管理—产业经济]