制度不均衡下的产权博弈:海南天然橡胶管制的经验  

The Game of Property Rights under the Unbalanced System:Experience from Hainan Natural Rubber Control

作　　者：许能锐[1] 李丽[1] XU Neng-rui LI Li(College of Economies and Management, Hainan University, Haikou 570228, Chin)

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2017年第1期35-40,共6页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

基　　金："海南大学中西部高校综合能力提升计划"资助;海南省2009年哲学社会科学规划课题(HNSK09-11)

摘　　要：制度这一公共品因其不均衡性的客观存在而渗出租值,诱引利益相关方竞相逐猎并最终导致公共领域租值消散。基于这一理论前提,对海南天然橡胶管制变迁过程中的产权博弈状况及导致的结果进行经验验证,结论认为,制度不均衡导致的产权博弈所产生的租值消散程度是由所有参与者的工资水平和政府监管的力度决定的。提出相应建议:贯彻依法治国理念,增强制度契合度,提高所有参与者的工资水平,以尽可能压缩制度不均衡导致的租值空间。Institution as a public thing has exudation of rental value due to its existence of disequilibrium, luring relevant stakeholders to compete and eventually leading to dissipation of rental value in the public domain. On the base of this theoretical premise, the game situations of property rights and their results in the changing process of Hainan natural rubber control are verified empirically. It draws the conclusion that the extent of rental value dissipation resulting from the games of property rights due to the institutional disequilibrium is decided by the level of all participants＇ salaries and the power of governmental supervision. Accordingly, it is suggested to implement the concept of rule of law, increase the compatibility of system, improve the level of all participants＇ salaries to compress the space of rental value caused by institutional disequilibrium as far as possible.

关 键 词：制度不均衡 产权博弈 橡胶管制 

分 类 号：F324[经济管理—产业经济]