资本投向差异与私利攫取——来自中国上市公司控制权转移的经验证据  

Change in Capital Allocation and Private Benefit Expropriation——Evidence from Control Right Transaction in Chinese Listed Firms

作　　者：张硕[1] 赵息[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,300072

出　　处：《会计研究》2016年第12期44-50,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(16AGL007)的资助

摘　　要：本文以控制权转移为背景,研究控制权私利攫取驱动下资本投向差异。结果表明,股权投资与控制权私利攫取负相关,固定资产及无形资产投资与私利攫取正相关。进一步研究发现:研发投入与国有公司大股东控制权私利攫取正相关;民营公司大股东通过股权投资提高控制权私利攫取水平;低市场化程度地区,大股东利用股权投资、固定资产及无形资产攫取私利水平显著下降;大股东利益侵占与未来公司业绩负相关,地方国有公司大股东利益侵占尤为严重。结果表明,在资本市场市场化程度日益加深的情况下,控制权私利攫取驱动资本投向差异,为引导政策性资源投入、完善资本市场秩序提供理论及经验支持。This study examines whether difference on capital allocation is determined by private benefit expropriation.Results show that expropriation is negatively related to equity investment,while it is positive associated with fixed and intangible asset investment.Expropriation from SOE firm is positive related to R&D input.Blockholder in private firm increases level of expropriation through equity.Level of expropriating from equity,fixed and intangible asset is decreased in lower marketization region.Blockholder expropriation is negative associated with future performance,especially on local SOE firm.Results indicate that marketization of capital being increased,difference on capital allocation driven by expropriation provides support of theory and experience on leading political resources into companies and improving the order in capital markets.

关 键 词：控制权私利 资本投向 利益攫取 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275