基于自由裁量贷款损失准备的经理自主权行为分析  

An Analysis of Managerial Discretion Behavior Based on Discretionary Loan Loss Provision

作　　者：张瑞稳[1] 李丹丹[1] ZHANG Rui-wen LI Dan-dan

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,合肥230000

出　　处：《金融论坛》2016年第12期30-39,共10页Finance Forum

摘　　要：本文以中国16家上市商业银行为研究对象,以自由裁量贷款损失准备为经理自主权的代理变量,分析中国商业银行经理人员在计提贷款损失准备方面的自主权行为。实证结果表明存在使用自由裁量贷款损失准备调整资本充足率和盈余管理的行为,银行还使用其来缓解风险和融资压力;银行经理人员主观感知到的经济下行和监管压力对自由裁量贷款损失准备有显著影响,经理人员在感知到经济下行后会减少计提自由裁量贷款损失准备,这在一定程度上缓解了贷款损失准备计提的顺周期性。In this paper, the 16 listed commercial banks in China are used as samples and the discretionary loan loss provision is used as the proxy variable of managerial discretion to analyze the managerial discretion behavior in loan loss provision of Chinese commercial banks. The empirical results of the paper show the behavior that the discretionary loan loss provision is used to adjust the capital adequacy ratio and earnings management exits in banks, and the discretionary loan loss provision is also used to mitigate risks and financing pressure; the economic downturn and regulatory pressures perceived by hank managers have significant impacts on discretionary loan loss provision, and the managers will reduce the discretionary loan loss provision when they perceive the economic downturn, which mitigates the pro-cyclical feature of loan loss provision to some extent.

关 键 词：商业银行 自由裁量贷款损失准备 经理自主权 资本充足率 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]