B2B市场中基于期权合同的零售商最优采购策略  

Optimal Procurement Strategy of Retailer Based on Option Contract with B2B E-Marketplaces

作　　者：夏雨[1] 方磊[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2017年第2期261-269,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371101)

摘　　要：针对B2B市场中期权合同在到期日前的可再次交易性,以资金约束的零售商为研究对象,分别构建无融资和有融资两种情形下零售商的收益模型,分析B2B市场中期权合同的可再次交易性对资金约束的零售商最优采购策略的影响。研究表明,期权合同的可再次交易性对两种情形下零售商的最优采购策略都会产生影响:在无融资的情形下,当市场波动水平较高时,随着自有资金的增加,零售商更倾向于使用期权合同采购;在有融资的情形下,随着自有资金的增加,银行贷款利率降低,长期价格合同最优的采购量降低,而期权合同最优的采购量上升。与无融资情形相比,零售商使用期权合同的采购量较低,使用长期价格合同的采购量相对较高。Given that the option contract can be speculated after expiration in B2B e-marketplaces, we establish retailer＇s profit models when credit is viable or not, and analyze the effect of the market liquidity on retailer＇s optimal procurement strategy. The results show that the market liquidity of spot market always has effects on retailer＇s procurement strategy in two scenarios. In the absence of credit financing scenario, when the market liquidity is high, the retailer will use more options as capital increase; in the credit financing scenario, with the increase of his own capital, bank loan interest rate is decrease, hence reduces long-term price contract procurement and raises option contract procurement. But retailer＇s long-term contract quantity is higher and option contract quantity is lower than it can＇t obtain loans.

关 键 词：B2B市场 资金约束 期权合同 采购策略 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]