刻意制造“两个中国”:战后日本逃避对华赔偿责任的战略逻辑  

Making “Two Chinas” purposely: The Strategic Logic of Japan's Refusal of War Reparations towards China

作　　者：王广涛[1] Wang Guangtao;

机构地区：[1]日本爱知大学国际中国学研究中心

出　　处：《日本研究》2016年第4期12-19,共8页Japan Studies

摘　　要：日本1952年得益于"旧金山媾和"重返国际社会。中国作为第二次世界大战中最大的受害国之一,因为美国的反对却没能参加旧金山会议,战争赔偿问题自然就成了战后中日关系中的重要议题。本文综合利用日、中双方的外交史料和先行文献,对战后日本拒绝对华赔偿的政策过程进行还原。笔者认为,日本在1952年的"日台和约"谈判和1972年的"中日邦交正常化谈判"中相继利用制造"两个中国"的战略,实现了不赔偿的政治目的。In 1952, Japan returned back to the international stage which profited from ＂Treaty of San Francisco＂. Because of opposition from US, China was not invited to attend the conference at San Francisco, although China claimed to be one of the biggest victim states.China＇s absence leaded Japan＇s war reparations to a prominent issue between the two countries. This paper makes a comprehensive use of the historic diplomatic archives and other first-hand files to restore Japan＇s basic logic as well as its policy-making process on its refusal of war reparations towards China. Author points out that, in the following negotiations with Kuomintang regime（Taiwan, 1952） and Chinese Government（1972）, Japan made full use of the ＂Two Chinas＂ strategy purposely to escape its war reparations to China.

关 键 词：战争赔偿 “两个中国” 中日关系 “日台和约” 中日邦交正常化 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系]