钱随官走:地方官员与地区间的资金流动  

Money Following Politicians:Local Officials and Interregional Cash Flows

作　　者：钱先航[1] 曹廷求[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,250100

出　　处：《经济研究》2017年第2期156-170,共15页Economic Research Journal

基　　金："泰山学者"专项工程经费资助;国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD069);国家自然科学基金项目(71302088);山东大学青年学者未来计划(2015WLJH13)的部分研究成果

摘　　要：本文检验了地方官员对地区间资金流动的作用。利用中国人民银行大额支付系统的数据,在匹配省委书记个体特征的基础上,本文考察了官员政治关联地区即出生地、第一工作地和来源地的资金是否会跟随官员流动,并进一步检验了官员异质性的影响。结果显示,相比非任职年份,在官员任职期间,其出生地和来源地的资金会更多地流入任职地区,存在"钱随官走"的现象,但第一工作地的资金未显著增加。而政治关联强度越大的地区,"钱随官走"的效应也越大。进一步的研究表明,基于情感和理性的平衡,这一效应还会因官员的任期、年龄及来源而有所不同。总体而言,本文的结果表明地方官员与资金流动的关系可能是源于官员情感与理性的平衡。本文的结论为完善我国地方官员治理及深化地区协调发展提供了新的视角。Summary： Much research has focused on the economic influence of politicians. Many studies have demonstrated that politicians affect not only macro-economic growth （Jones and Olken, 2005 ; Besley et al. , 2011 ） , but also micro corporate behavior （Julio and Yook, 2012; Luo et al. , 2016）. However, current research has investigated only the macro or micro level individually, breaking the link between the two. There is no intermediate-level perspective that looks at how to transmit the effect of micro-level corporate behavior to macro-level economic growth. Corporate investment is associated with cash flow, the key factor promoting economic growth. Thus, cash flow is the appropriate intermediate variable linking the micro and macro levels. This paper explores the relationship between local officials and cash flow, facilitating the establishment of a more complete theoretical framework.

关 键 词：地方官员 政治关联地区 资金流动 大额支付系统 

分 类 号：D630.3[政治法律—政治学] F832.2[政治法律—中外政治制度]