可证明安全的基于证书聚合签名方案  

A Provably-Secure Certificate-Based Aggregate Signature Scheme

作　　者：胡江红[1] 杜红珍[1] 张建中[2] 

机构地区：[1]宝鸡文理学院数学与信息科学学院,陕西宝鸡721013 [2]陕西师范大学数学与信息科学学院,陕西西安710062

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2017年第3期128-135,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61402015);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划(2015JM6263);宝鸡市科技计划项目(14GYGG-4-2;15RKX-1-5-8);宝鸡文理学院一般项目(YK1618)

摘　　要：对刘云芳等人提出的基于证书聚合签名方案进行安全性分析,指出方案不能抵抗类型Ⅱ敌手攻击,并给出两种攻击方法,在此基础上提出了一个新的可证安全的基于证书聚合签名方案,利用Diffie-Hellman困难问题,在随机预言模型下证明了新方案是存在性不可伪造的.另外,新方案的聚合签名长度是固定常数,与签名者的数量无关,在签名验证中只需要4个对运算和n个标量乘运算,因此,新方案的签名验证效率得到很大提高.Through analysis of a certificate-based aggregate signature scheme proposed by Liu Yun fang et al, it was revealed that the scheme could not resist the second type adversary attack, and two kinds of attack methods were given. Based on this scheme, a provably-secure certificate-based aggregate signature scheme was proposed in this paper. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, it was proved that the new scheme was secure against existential forgery attack in the random oracle model. Finally, comparing the efficiency between the new scheme and other schemes, the result shows that the length of aggregate signature in the new scheme is constant and independent of the number of signers; moreover, the new scheme only needs four pairing computations and n scalar multiplications. Therefore, the new scheme is more efficient.

关 键 词：聚合签名 基于证书密码体制 随机预言模型 Diffie—Hellman困难问题 

分 类 号：TN918.91[电子电信—通信与信息系统]