指标控制与依法行政:双重治理模式的实证研究  

Administration According to Law and Governance by Index:Empirical Research about the Double Model of Governance of Local Government in China

作　　者：万江[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学经济法学院

出　　处：《法学家》2017年第1期1-16,共16页The Jurist

基　　金：西南财经大学法学院中国经济法治研究中心资助

摘　　要：指标考核与依法行政都是控制地方政府的治理机制,均为我国《宪法》所认可。指标控制重结果而轻过程,依法行政只能规范过程而缺乏激励功能。因此,单独使用任一治理手段,都无法有效解决"两个积极性"问题。两种手段并行使用得当,才是激励约束相容的治理机制,远比单一治理模式更为有效。何者占优取决于政治交易成本。实证分析表明,指标控制与依法行政具有互补关系,但互补性开始降低。因指标治理强化中央权威而弱化法治权威,指标控制与依法行政之间有冲突的可能,故而需要区分依法行政和指标考核的不同功能,设计科学的国家治理体系。As a part of governance system in China,the central-government uses double model of governance including rule of law and rule by index,to consolidate the authority and legitimacy of the government.Indexmechanism focuses on the result but ignores the standard procedures.In contrast,law-mechanism focuses on the standard procedures but lacks incentive being properly used.The double model of governance is an incentive compatibility constraint,for the rule of law can establish the bottom line of the government behavior,and the rule by index can stimulate the officials by performance measurement and political tournaments.Now,the central-government uses performance measurement to promote administration legally.However,the index-mechanism may undermine the authority of the rule of law.We need to coordinate the index-mechanism and the law-mechanism.

关 键 词：地方政府 政治交易成本 依法行政 指标考核 双重治理 

分 类 号：D922.1[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]