审计师-客户长期关系、强制轮换与审计质量  

The Long-term Auditor-client Relationship,Mandatory Rotation and Audit Quality

作　　者：许浩然[1] 魏汉泽[2] 张敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]中国农业发展银行,北京100045

出　　处：《财经论丛》2017年第3期60-70,共11页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(15XNQ021)

摘　　要：本文从审计师-客户长期关系的视角出发,对审计师强制轮换与审计质量之间的关系进行了探讨。研究发现:对于财务状况较差的公司,若审计师与客户之间不存在长期关系,则强制轮换后的审计质量显著提高,若审计师与客户之间存在长期关系,则强制轮换后审计质量的提高被弱化;而对于财务状况较好的公司,无论审计师与客户之间是否存在长期关系,强制轮换后的审计质量均未发生显著变化。本文研究对审计师强制轮换的监管具有借鉴意义。From the perspective of long-term auditor-client relationship,this paper investigates the relationship between the mandatory auditor rotation and the audit quality. The results are as follws：（ 1） For the firms in poor financial situation,if there is no long-term relationship between the auditor and the client,the audit quality can be improved significantly after the mandatory auditor rotation; if there is a long-term relationship between the auditor and the client,the effect of the mandatory auditor rotation on the improvement of the audit quality will be weakened;（ 2） For the firms in good financial situation,whether there is a long-term relationship between the auditor and the client,the audit quality does not change significantly after mandatory auditor rotation. This paper contributes to the literature on mandatory auditor rotation,and the conclusion of this paper has important policy implications for regulators.

关 键 词：审计师-客户长期关系 审计师强制轮换 财务状况 审计质量 

分 类 号：F239.2[经济管理—会计学]