政府补贴、企业属性与过度投资——基于中国A股上市企业的实证研究  

Government Subsidies,Enterprises' Property and Over-investment——An Empirical Research Based on the Data of China's A-share Listed Companies

作　　者：徐震[1] 黄健柏[1,2] 郭尧琦[3] XU Zhen HUANG Jianbai GUO Yaoqi(School of Business, Central South University, Changsha, 410083, China Institute of Metal Resources Strategy, Central South University, Changsha, Hunan, 410083, China School of Mathematics and Statistics, Central South University, Changsha, Hunan, 410083, China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [2]中南大学金属资源战略研究院,湖南长沙410083 [3]中南大学数学与统计学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第1期73-84,共12页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"产能过剩矛盾突出的行业发展趋势和调整化解对策研究"(13&ZD024);中南大学博士研究生自主探索创新项目"政府干预;工业用地价格扭曲与企业过度投资"(2014zzts008)

摘　　要：文章探讨了政府补贴对于不同亏损情况和所有制属性企业过度投资行为的影响。利用2000—2015年中国A股制造业上市企业数据,研究发现政府补贴对于企业过度投资具有显著的推动作用。这种推动作用对于不同亏损情况和所有制属性的企业存在差异。与亏损企业相比,政府补贴对于未亏损企业过度投资的促进效应更为显著。进一步考虑企业所有制属性发现,政府补贴对于未亏损民营企业的过度投资的促进效应最强,其次是未亏损国有企业,再次是亏损民营企业,而政府补贴对亏损国有企业的过度投资的促进效应最弱。研究结论对我国企业过度投资的治理具有一定的启示意义。This paper discussed impacts that government subsidies have on over-investment of manufacturing companies under different condition of loss and different nature of ownership. Using the data of China＇s A-share listed manufacturing companies between 2000 and 2015, the study finds that government subsidies have greatly promoted the over-investment of manufacturing companies, and such promotion shows difference as the conditions of loss and the nature of ownership of the manufacturing com- panies vary. Compared with unprofitable companies, government subsidies have greater promotion effects on the over-investment of profitable companies. When taking the nature of ownership of companies into further consideration, one can find that the pro- motion effects of government subsidies on the over-investment of profitable private companies is most significant, the effect on the over-investment of the profitable state-owned companies is in the second place, the effect on the over-investment of the unprofita- ble private companies is in the third place. The promotion effect of government subsidies on the over-investment of the unprofita- ble state-owned enterprises is the weakest. The conclusion of this paper has some implications for the over-investment governance of Chinese companies.

关 键 词：政府补贴 过度投资 亏损情况 政策性负担 目标管理 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济]