逆向选择、道德风险与精准救助  

Adverse Selection,Moral Hazard and Accurate Assistance: Theory,Practice and Policy Direction

作　　者：胡思洋[1,2] 赵曼[3] 

机构地区：[1]民政部政策研究中心,北京100721 [2]清华大学,北京100084 [3]中南财经政法大学,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《国家行政学院学报》2017年第1期94-98,共5页Journal of China National School of Administration

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(16CSH030);第59批博士后基金面上资助项目(2016M591141)

摘　　要：适度水平、逆向选择和道德风险是精准救助需要解决的核心问题。本文从这三个方面对国内外文献进行了回顾,研究发现:1.对于低保救助的适度水平及路径选择,学界尚有争议。2.在解决逆向选择问题上,我国的低保制度尚缺乏有效的信号甄别机制。3.国内忽视了对低保供方道德风险的研究,可能会影响精准救助的效果及政策实施偏差。建议如下:低保制度应当"精准定位",回归救助制度的功能本位;用市场化、信息化手段解决逆向选择和道德风险问题;同精准扶贫以及民间慈善救助进行"精准对接",形成合理的政策网络;通过舆论引导,使社会预期回归理性。Moderate levels,adverse selection and moral hazard are the core of accurate assistance. Based on the literature review,this paper found that:( 1) Controversy still exists on the moderate level and the selection of the path.( 2) We lack the effective signal screening mechanism to solve the problem of adverse selection.( 3) We have neglected the research on the supplier's moral hazard,which may affect the effect and the deviation of policy implementation. Recommendations are as follows: subsistence allowances system should be'accurate',return to the function of the assistance system standard; the government should do a good job of policy convergence between accurate assistance,targeted poverty alleviation and civilian charities,to form a reasonable policy network; the government should guide the social expectation return to rationality.

关 键 词：精准救助 信息不对称 逆向选择 道德风险 信号甄别 

分 类 号：C913.7[经济管理]