碳补贴:生产企业or消费者?——基于集中决策两级低碳供应链优化视角  

Carbon Subsidy: Enterprises or Consumers?——From Perspective of Centralized Decision-making Two-level Low Carbon Supply Chain Optimization

作　　者：杨仕辉[1] 付菊[1] 杨景茜 YANG Shihui FU Ju YANG Jingqian(School of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China School of Mathematical Science, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China)

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632 [2]中国海洋大学数学科学学院,山东青岛266100

出　　处：《山东财经大学学报》2017年第2期78-85,共8页Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"环境倾销与环境管制的博弈分析;效应比较与策略选择"(71273114);国家社会科学基金重大项目"我国重点生态功能区市场化生态补偿机制研究"(15ZDA054)

摘　　要：文章基于两级低碳供应链视角,针对制造商主导情景,建立了碳补贴生产企业政策优化决策博弈模型,得到了均衡解,分析了供应链成员企业定价和减排优化策略,采用罗宾斯坦议价模型求得供应链协调均衡解;与碳补贴消费者政策进行比较,发现两种政策各有所长,没有绝对优劣之分,仅可以相互部分替代;基于总量控制和目标减排导向,给出了政府补贴消费者政策和补贴生产企业政策最优选择的边界条件,但政府两种政策都不能同时实现总量控制和目标减排。在此基础上,提出了相应的政策建议。From the perspective of two-level low carbon supply chain and aimed at the manufacturer-dominating scenario, this paper establishes a carbon subsidy enterprise policy optimization game model, obtains the equilibrium solution, analyzes supply chain member pricing and emission reduction optimization strategies, gets supply chain co- ordination equilibrium solution by adopting Rubinstein bargaining model, and makes a comparison with carbon subsi- dy consumer policy. The results show that the two different policies have their own good points without absolute ad- vantage and can replace each other only partially. Based on total amount control and target emission reduction orien- tation, the boundary conditions are provided for the optimal selection of government subsidy consumer policy and government subsidy enterprise policy, but neither of the two policies can achieve total control and target emission re- duction. On such a basis, the corresponding policy recommendations are put forward.

关 键 词：碳补贴生产企业政策 碳补贴消费者政策 低碳供应链 博弈 

分 类 号：F742[经济管理—国际贸易]