地方领导人更替与中国国有经济投资行为——基于省际面板数据的分析  

Local Leaders' Replacement and the Investment Behaviors of China's State-owned Economy——Analysis Based on the Provincial Panel Data

作　　者：吴晓飞[1] WU Xiaofei(School of Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2017年第2期32-40,共9页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"企业原始创新的决定因素与影响效应研究"(项目编号:14AJL008);国家自然科学基金青年项目"互联网时代定向广告与企业竞争行为分析"(项目编号:71502092)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在地方领导人更替的条件下,国有经济投资行为必然会对此做出反应,并进一步影响地区经济的发展。使用中国1994-2013年相关省际面板数据,采用系统GMM方法对此进行定量分析,研究发现省委书记更替对当年的国有经济投资具有显著的负向影响,而省长更替对当年的国有经济投资则具有显著的正向影响。在将更替形式区分为实质性更替与连任的情形后,研究发现地方领导人的实质性更替对国有经济投资的影响十分显著,而连任对于国有经济投资的影响则显著性较低。上述研究结论表明,政府相关部门应适时制定一些投资指导政策,以降低地方领导人更替阶段的国有经济投资波动幅度,维持地区经济的平稳增长。Under the condition of local leaders＇ replacement,the investment behaviors of state-owned economy will respond and further influence the development of regional economy.Using Chinese provincial panel data from 1994 to 2013 and system GMM model to make quantitative analysis,we find that the replacement of provincial party committee secretary has significant negative impact on the investment of state-owned economy in the same year.In contrast,the replacement of governor has significant positive influence.If we divide the change form into ＂ substantial replacement＂ and ＂ reappointment＂,we find that substantial replacement has very significant influence while the reappointment is significantly lower.The result shows that governments should make some investment policies to reduce the investment volatility of state-owned economy during the local leaders＇ replacement so as to maintain the steady growth of regional economy.

关 键 词：国有经济 投资行为 地方领导人更替 政策不确定性 政策激励 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]