企业失责行为与居民的选择性反应——来自上市企业的证据  

Corporate Irresponsible Behaviors and Residents' Selective Responses:Evidence from the Listed Firms

作　　者：杨继生[1] 阳建辉 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院 [2]中国中投证券博士后科研工作站

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2016年第4期275-296,共22页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目"交互(分组)效应面板数据模型理论与应用研究"(201304);国家自然科学基金面上项目"平衡/非平衡交互效应面板SVAR模型的估计量与应用研究"(71271096);中央高校基本科研业务费(2014TS151)资助

摘　　要：本文根据企业失责行为曝光后的市场表现,分析居民的反应特征和市场监督效应。结果显示,居民对企业不同类型失责行为的反应具有选择性。对于利害关系直接并且权责明晰的产品质量和安全事故问题,居民反应强烈。对社会危害较大但负外部性较强的环境污染问题,居民反应淡漠。居民的选择性反应使企业可以借助资金实力或市场地位改善其收益,弱化社会监督效应。所以,市场对环境污染没有约束力,环境保护只能依赖于政府管制。In this paper we try to analyze the characteristics of residents＇ responses and market supervision effects by examining the market performance of firms, after the exposure of their irresponsible behaviors. We find that residents＇ responses are selective towards differ- ent corporate social irresponsibility. The residents response positively to product quality and safety accidents as their rights and interests are affected directly- however, the residents re- sponse indifferently to environment pollution accidents despite of their social harm and strong external effect. These selective responses can help firms make use of their financial strength or market status to weaken social supervision effect. Therefore, the market has no restriction on environment pollution, and environment protection should depend on administrative regu- lation from the government.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 居民选择性反应 环境污染 

分 类 号：D03[政治法律—政治学]