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作 者:傅勇[1] 李良松[2] FU Yong LI Liangsong(The People's Bank of China, 100800 Shanghai Head Office, the People's Bank of China, 200120)
机构地区:[1]中国人民银行办公厅 [2]中国人民银行上海总部国际部
出 处:《财贸经济》2017年第3期5-20,共16页Finance & Trade Economics
基 金:中国金融四十人青年论坛专项课题;上海领军人才队伍建设专项资金;国家自然科学基金青年项目"混业经营背景下我国商业银行非利息业务发展及其影响研究"(71603085)
摘 要:财政分权和晋升激励向地方政府植入了为增长而竞争的基因,但这不足以解释中国地方政府对经济金融运行的影响为何远大于其他国家。我们认为,现有中国式分权的分析框架需考虑地方政府对金融杠杆的运用。本文研究发现,金融分权会加大通货膨胀和经济过热风险,从而促使中央政府紧缩调控。中央-地方财税关系在分税制改革相对固化后,中央政府更倾向于调整金融分权边界,以达到调控目的,从而使地方政府性债务增速逆经济周期变化。本文主要政策含义是:金融监管体制改革应统筹考虑建立双层金融监管体系,明确地方政府的金融管理职能,向地方政府金融放权作为逆周期调控手段的做法需要扭转。Fiscal decentralization and promotion incentives are the main factors that drive local governments in China to compete for economic growth with each other. However, this regime is only part one reason that local governments in China have greater influence on economic cycle than their counterparts in other countries. We believe that financial decentralization should also be taken into account. Empirical results indicate that excess financial decentralization would incur higher risk of inflation and economic overheating. After tax-sharing reform in 1994, the central government adjusted the boundary of financial decentralization while local governments borrowed more money during the economic downturn. Therefore, we suggest that a two-tiered financial supervisory system should be set up in the new round of financial reform and financial decentralization should be adjusted in compatible with the changing market economy in China.
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