中国上市公司会计造假的博弈均衡分析  

China's listed company's accounting fraud of the Game Equilibrium Theory

作　　者：张立俊[1] Zhang Li-jun(Suzhou Institute of Trade and Commerce, Suzhou Jiangsu 215009,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州经贸职业技术学院,江苏苏州215009

出　　处：《北方经贸》2017年第3期109-112,共4页Northern Economy and Trade

摘　　要：随着中国经济的蓬勃发展和投资者的日趋成熟,企业的投资、融资需求也日益加大,投资者及社会公众对上市公司会计信息的透明度要求相应地水涨船高,但近年来会计信息失真,乃至造假案件频发,严重干扰了资本市场的健康发展。通过运用经济学的博弈均衡分析方法探讨了上市公司会计造假的现象及原因,并尝试提出适合中国国情的上市公司会计监管措施。As China＇s economy booming and investors be- come more sophisticated, corporate investment and financ- ing needs of a growing, investors and the public on the transparency of accounting information requirements are also getting higher and higher, but in recent years have lost and reliable accounting information , relevance of qualitative characteristics of false cases of frequent, severe disturbance of the healthy development of capita] markets, this paper used the method of game theory analysis of the inhibition phenomenon of listed company＇s accounting fraud, and made suitable to China＇s national conditions and accounting control measures.

关 键 词：上市公司 会计造假 监管 模型 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]