不完全信息动态博弈视角下的食品安全责任保险问题研究——基于参与主体之间的KMRW声誉博弈  

A Study of the Problem of Food Safety Liability Insurance from the Perspective of Incomplete Information Dynamic Game:A KMRW Reputation Game Based on the Participating Subjects

作　　者：王康[1] 孙健[1] 周欣[1] WANG Kang SUN Jian ZHOU Xin(University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学保险学院,北京100029

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2017年第2期70-76,共7页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：河北省科技厅基金项目"京津冀协同发展背景下河北省绿色金融发展路径优化研究"(154576281)

摘　　要：基于博弈论的视角,通过研究保险公司与食品企业之间的KMRW声誉博弈、保险公司尽职检查的博弈以及中介机构与食品企业串谋违规上报的博弈情况,分析食品安全责任保险运行过程中保险公司、中介机构与食品企业三者之间的博弈关系。结果表明:声誉缺失未能引起食品企业足够的重视且对维持声誉动力不足,进而导致食品的生产不能达到安全标准。保险公司应该建立声誉测量机制和奖惩机制,以达到对食品企业监督和约束的目的,同时能够使企业获得合理的利润。此外,保险公司还应建立中介机构的考核体系,降低中介机构的违规概率。From the perspective of game theory, this paper studies such game cases as the KMRW reputation game between insurance companies and food enterprises, the due diligence game of in- surance companies and the game of collusion and violation reports between intermediary agencies and food enterprises. Then it analyzes the game relationship between insurance companies, intermediary a- gencies and food enterprises during the operation process of food safety liability insurance. The results show that loss of reputation has failed to bring sufficient attention to the food enterprises; besides, it lacks sufficient momentum to maintain reputation, which causes the production of food not meeting the safety standards. The insurance companies should establish reputation measurement mechanism and rewards and punishment mechanism, so as to achieve the purpose of supervision and restriction over food enterprises while enabling the enterprises to obtain reasonable profits. In addition, the insurance companies should also establish an assessment system against intermediary agencies, so as to reduce the probability of their violations.

关 键 词：食品安全责任保险 监管 KMRW声誉博弈 

分 类 号：F840.686[经济管理—保险]