政府干预、货币政策与企业资本投资  

Government Intervention, Monetary Policy, and Capital Investment

作　　者：赵静[1] 陈晓[2] JING ZHAO XIAO CHEN

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心 [2]清华大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2016年第3期295-316,共22页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372050);北京市社会科学基金项目(16YJC041)的资助

摘　　要：基于转型经济时期政企关系的特征，本文从宏观、微观结合的视角研究货币政策调控对企业资本投资结构和效率的传导效果，进而通过货币政策波动这一经济政策外生窗口，考察地方政府干预的程度、模式和路径与资本投资之间的关系。研究发现，货币政策对中央企业投资有较好的调控效果；由于地方政府经济目标和货币政策传导机制影响的差异，导致宏观货币政策调控在地方企业资本投资决策中产生弱效和扭曲；但当货币政策的调控方向和地方政府目标一致时，地方政府的干预也能加强货币政策调控的效果。同时，在地方政府的干预下，紧缩货币政策对过度投资的抑制作用并不明显，但是投资不足却得到明显的改善。Focusing on the relationship between government and enterprises in transition economies, this paper discuss how macro monetary policy transmission effects micro-enter- prise capital investment structure and efficiency, and through the exogenous window of mone- tary policy fluctuations, find the relationships among the degree, patterns and path of govern- ment intervention and the capital investment. The results show that due to differences in the economic objectives of local government and the impact of monetary policy transmission mech- anism, a weak macroeconomic effect of monetary policy and distortions is found in micro-en- terprise capital investment decisions. But when the direction of monetary policy and the targetof local government are consistent, local government intervention can enhance the effect of monetary policy. On one hand, when the monetary policy tightening, in the area of the stron ger government intervention, and among the SOEs with high share concentration or the companies＇ CEOs with political connection background, monetary policy transmission is devi ated when enterprises make investment decisions. On the other hand, in the strong local gov ernment intervention areas, monetary policy obvious, but the under-investment has been s tightening ignificantly inhibition of over investment is not improved.

关 键 词：货币政策 政府干预 资本投资 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F822.0[政治法律—中外政治制度] F275[经济管理—财政学]