公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理  

Corporate Governance,Directors &Officers Liability Insurance and Earnings Management

作　　者：胡国柳[1] 赵阳[1] HU Guoliu ZHAO Yang(School of Economics and Managements, Hainan University, Haikou,Hainan 570228, Chin)

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济与管理学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2017年第2期74-80,共7页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71562010)

摘　　要：董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有"兜底"效应,降低了董事高管的执业风险。选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响,进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异。研究结果表明:董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为;随着公司治理水平提高,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱。Directors and officers liability insurance（DO insurance）will exert a ＂fallback＂ effect for the directors and executives in civil litigation,reduce the risk of the executive director.We choose 2002-2014 China A-share listed companies as samples to investigate the relationship between DO insurance and earnings management and further analyze the relationship between earnings management.The results show that the DO insurance will aggravate the introduction of earnings management behavior;at the different corporate governance level,it can weaken the positive correlation between earnings management and DO insurance.

关 键 词：公司治理董事 高管责任 保险盈余管理 

分 类 号：F840.69[经济管理—保险]