终极控制人性质、异质机构投资者持股与企业风险承担  

作　　者：冀玛丽 杜晓荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2017年第3期117-123,共7页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：江苏省社科基金项目"网络环境下企业创新行为与会计决策机制研究"(项目编号:15GLB007);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目"基于企业知识产权运营视角的管理会计系统研究--以江苏高新技术企业为例"(项目编号:2015ZDIXM011)

摘　　要：本文以2010-2014年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验了机构投资者持股对企业风险承担的影响。研究结果表明:机构投资者总体持股与企业风险承担显著正相关,且非国有企业的提升效果优于国有企业;大机构投资者持股的提升效果优于小机构投资者;压力抵制型机构投资者与压力敏感型机构投资者对企业风险承担水平的促进作用存在差异,相对于后者,前者的促进作用更大。本文的研究结论支持了机构投资者整体的"有效监督假说",并且说明机构投资者对企业风险承担的提升作用,因机构投资者特征以及企业终极控制人性质的不同而存在差异。Based on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as samples, the paper tests the impact of institutional investors＂ shareholding on firm risk-taking. The results show that the overall shareholding of institutional investors bears a significant positive correlation with enterprise risk-taking, and the promotion effect of non-state-owned enterprises is better than that of state-owned enterprises; big institutional investors＂ shareholding has superior promotion effect to small institutional investors; there are differences between pressure resistance type of institutional investors and pressure sensitive institutional investors for the promotion of enterprise risk bearing, and relative to the latter, the role of the former is stronger. Research conclusion of this paper supports the hypothesis of effective supervision of institutional in- vestors as a whole, and shows that there exist some differences for the roles of institutional investors to the promotion of enterprise risk bearing due to different institutional investor characteristics and different ultimate control person natures.

关 键 词：终极控制人性质 机构投资者 异质性 企业风险承担 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]