基于双重声誉的重大工程工厂化预制动态激励机制  

Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for the Suppliers of Mega Project Considering Double Reputation

作　　者：时茜茜[1] 朱建波[1] 盛昭瀚[1] 刘慧敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,南京210093

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2017年第2期338-345,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目(71390521);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501084;71301062;71271107;71471077;71571098;71201073);江苏省研究生培养创新工程项目(KYZZ15_0023;KYLX15_0031);交通运输部建设科技项目(2013318282310)

摘　　要：重大工程拥有超越一般工程的影响力,参与重大工程建设成为其关键部件供应商将显著提高企业品牌价值和影响力,因此,将声誉机制引入重大工程工厂化预制商的激励模型中可以更好地促使其考虑未来收益而提高当前的努力水平。为此构建双重声誉激励与显性激励相结合的两阶段动态激励模型,分析声誉对代理人市场的激励机理,并与不考虑声誉机制的显性激励模型进行对比,得到声誉激励机制实现帕累托改善的基本条件。最后,结合数据模拟进行验证。结果表明:在一定条件下引入声誉激励机制可以更好地协调业主与预制商的合作关系,防范代理人道德风险;显性声誉激励可以降低合作双方的信息不对称并提高工厂化预制商第1阶段的努力水平,隐性声誉激励对工厂化预制商在两阶段内有持续性的激励作用。Being a key supplier in the mega project may significantly increase its brand value and impact, thus a dynamic incentive mechanism based on reputation theory may improve the supplier＇s effort. We construct a two-stage dynamic incentive model combining double reputation mechanism with explicit incentive mechanism and analyze the incentive mechanism. We also compare the model with a model of explicit incentive contract without reputation mechanism and derive the conditions for Pareto improvement. Numerical simulation is used to validate the model. The study shows that under certain conditions, the mechanism coordinates the cooperation between the owner and the supplier if the reputation mechanism is introduced. Explicit reputation incentive mechanism works in the first stage, and implicit reputation incentive mechanism works in two stages.

关 键 词：工厂化预制 重大工程 双重声誉 动态激励 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]