我国婴幼儿奶粉行业市场进入博弈分析及对国内企业的启示  

Game analysis on market entry of China's infant formula industry and enlightenment on domestic enterprises

作　　者：刘坤丽[1] 韩纪琴[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学经济管理学院,南京210095

出　　处：《中国乳品工业》2017年第3期43-46,51,共5页China Dairy Industry

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71273137);农业部948国别研究项目(2015-c5)

摘　　要：结合我国婴幼儿奶粉行业的市场特征,从单期博弈和重复博弈两个方面分析婴幼儿奶粉企业的市场进入博弈,发现我国婴幼儿奶粉的市场进入博弈呈现出两级分化特征,即国外潜在进入企业会选择进入利益更大的高端奶粉市场,而国内的潜在进入企业则选择中低端奶粉市场。影响博弈均衡结果的关键因素是我国婴幼儿奶粉行业的成本,而由于长期利益的考虑,无限次重复博弈和单期博弈的均衡结果不同。对于国内企业来说,要通过有效地途径降低成本以及技术变革和创新全面提高产品质量。虽然从目前来看,国内企业选择进入中低端奶粉市场可能性更大,但随着企业品牌的逐渐树立和企业实力的壮大,进入收益更高的高端奶粉市场也指日可待。Combined with the market characteristics of China＇s infant formula industry, this paper analyzes enterprise＇s game on market entry from two aspects： single game and repeated game. This paper found that game on market entry of China＇s infant formula industry presents two level differentiation characteristics. Foreign enterprises will choose to enter into the more high-end milk market, while domestic enterprises select enter into the low-end market milk. The key factor that affects the equilibrium result of game is the cost of infant formula industry. Because of the long-term interest, the equilibrium result of repeated game and single game is different. For domestic enterprises, reducing costs and improving product quality from innovation are effective ways. At present the domestic enterprises choose to enter the low-end milk market, but with the building of brand development and enterprise growth, the domestic enterprises will enter into high-end milk market in the near future.

关 键 词：婴幼儿奶粉市场 市场进入博弈 重复博弈 

分 类 号：TS731.53[轻工技术与工程—制浆造纸工程]