中小微企业信用担保贷款风险比例分担研究——提供政府补贴的两方合作博弈模型  

Research on the Risk Sharing Ratio of the Guarantee Loans in Micro,Small and Medium Enterprises——Based on the Two Party Cooperation Game Model with Government Subsidies

作　　者：王淼[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学经济学院,天津300222

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2017年第3期62-68,共7页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"经济周期;融资约束与营运资本的动态协同选择"(71302114);天津市哲学社会科学研究规划项目"银政企合作博弈框架下的中小微企业贷款融资机制研究"(TJYY13-042);天津市教委项目天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究项目"滨海新区构建富有竞争力的现代金融产业集群研究"(2014ZD08)

摘　　要：信用担保贷款是我国中小微企业融资的重要渠道之一。然而在我国融资实践中,担保机构几乎承担了信用担保贷款的全部风险敞口,加之中小微企业自身弱势和较高的违约风险,担保机构与商业银行更加难以达成合作。相关研究表明,中小微企业具有"准公共品"的性质,其融资适用于"政府和市场共同分担"原则。文章在政府提供补贴的前提下,构建商业银行与担保机构的两方合作博弈模型,运用Shapley值法求解公平合理的风险分担比例,进而为中小微企业信用担保贷款融资体系形成并可持续发展提供理论和实践支持。Credit guarantee loan is one of the important channels for the financing of micro,small and medium enterprises in our country. However,the guarantee institutions in our country bear almost all the risk exposure of credit guarantee loans in practice. Guarantee institutions and commercial banks can not cooperate with each other,especially because micro,small and medium enterprises are always in a weak position and with high default risk. Research shows that micro,small and medium enterprises have the nature of Quasi-public Goods,and its financing applies to the principle of sharing between government and market. So assuming the government to provide subsidies,we build the two party Cooperation Game Model of commercial banks and guarantee agencies in this paper,and use Shapley Value Method to sort out the fair and reasonable risk sharing ratio between them,which may be helpful for developing the credit guarantee loan financing system in micro,small and medium enterprises.

关 键 词：中小微企业融资 信用担保贷款 合作博弈 风险分担比例 

分 类 号：F832.42[经济管理—金融学]