政治周期驱动下的企业研发投入研究  

Research on Corporate R&D Input under the Drive of Political Cycle

作　　者：戴静[1] 王红建[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院金融学院,湖北武汉430205 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《当代财经》2017年第4期14-24,共11页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"金融错配对企业创新的影响研究--基于创新异质性视角"(16YJC790013)

摘　　要：基于官员激励机制视角,分析了政府官员在有限任期内对辖区企业研发(R&D)投入产生影响的作用机制。由于R&D指标于2000年首次纳入"十五"计划,对2000-2012年的企业R&D投入与省级官员任期的检验结果显示,企业R&D投入与官员任期呈现显著的倒U型关系,企业R&D投入在官员任期内先增加后下降。进一步检验发现,企业R&D投入来源中政府资金部分与官员任期同样存在倒U型关系,而银行信贷部分与官员任期的关系并不显著,说明官员主要通过动用财政补贴对辖区企业R&D投入施加影响。官员任期的影响会继续传导至企业的R&D产出和效率,而对比检验1990-1999年数据显示,官员任期对企业R&D投入的影响在"十五"计划实施之前并不显著。From the perspective of official incentive mechanism, this paper analyzes the actionmechanism on local corporate R＆D input during the limited tenure of the government officials. Be- cause the R＆D indicators have been included in ＂the Tenth Five-Year Plan＂ since the year of 2000, this paper examines the relationship between the enterprise R＆D input and the tenure of the provin- cial officials from 2000 to 2012. The results show that there exists a significant inversed U-type rela- tionship between the corporate R＆D input and the official tenure： the enterprise R＆D input first in- creases then decrease during the local officials＇ tenure. Further examination finds that similar inverted U-shaped relationship exists between the part of government fund in the corporate R＆D input and the official＇ s tenure, while the part of bank credit is not significantly related with the official＇ s tenure, which indicates that the local officials mainly exert influence on the local corporate R＆D input through the use of financial subsidies. The effect of local official＇s tenure will continue to pass on the corporate R＆D input and efficiency. While a comparison to the data of 1990-1999 shows that the official＇s tenure has no significant influence on the local corporate R＆D input before the implementa- tion of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.

关 键 词：官员任期 政治周期 企业R&D投入 R&D强度 

分 类 号：F061.2[经济管理—政治经济学]