集群品牌风险的博弈论研究述评  

Research Review on the Game Theory about Cluster Brand Risks

作　　者：宋永高[1] 张宏[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《浙江理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第2期98-105,共8页Journal of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BSH107)

摘　　要：文章在文献梳理基础上,把作为公共资产的集群品牌风险分为"搭便车"风险、"公共地"风险和机会主义风险。在此基础上,对集群品牌三类风险的博弈论研究进行了批判性述评。述评以相关研究为主线,详细分析了集群品牌"公共地"风险和机会主义风险论证中存在的前提假设不当、推理论证错误,或假设过于简化,未能充分揭示集群品牌风险及其形成机制。述评发现,目前还未有真正对"搭便车"风险的博弈论研究。文章认为集群品牌风险的博弈论研究虽然取得突破,但是相关研究还需要修正、完善和深化,或需要做更具开拓性的工作。Based on the literature review, this paper classified cluster brand risks into ree “ commons” risk and opportunism risk. On this basis, a critic review was conducted on the game theory studies about the three risks of cluster brand. The review took relevant studies as main line,and analyzed improper precondition hypothesis and inference demonstration mistakes existing in “commons” risk and opportunism risk of cluster brand, or too simplified assumptions of a cluster so that cluster brand risks and the formation mechanism failed to be revealed fully. It is found that there is no game theory study on “ free ride” risk of cluster brand. Although the game theory studies on cluster brand risks have achieved a breakthrough, relevant researches still need to be improved or deepened, and even some ground-breaking work is required.

关 键 词：集群品牌 集群品牌风险 公共资产 博弈论 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学] F061.5