阿马蒂亚·森的比较正义再解构  

Re-deconstruction of Amartya's Comparative Justice

作　　者：丁雪枫[1] Ding Xuefeng

机构地区：[1]南京政治学院马克思主义学院,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《重庆社会科学》2017年第3期121-127,共7页Chongqing Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"现代伦理学诸理论形态研究"(批准号:10&ZD072)

摘　　要：针对罗尔斯公平的正义存在着探寻完善的正义而轻视现实的正义、关注制度的正确而轻视社会的互动、强调抽象的认同而轻视理论的可行等先验制度主义的价值缺陷,阿马蒂亚·森建构了比较的正义,力图以可行能力基础、实质自由原则、幸福标准等价值合理性颠覆公平的正义。比较的正义在创新正义理论的同时,推进了正义理论的实践转向。Rawls＇ Justice Theory exists value defect, that are exploring the perfect justice rather than the reality of justice, paying attention to the correctness of the system and despising the social interaction, emphasizing the abstract identity and despising the feasibility of the theory. Aimed at Rawls＇ Justice Theory, Amartya Sen constructed comparative justice and tried to subvert the justice based on the basis of practical ability, the principle of substantial freedom and the criterion of happiness. The theory of comparative justice innovated the justice theory and promoted it to turn to the practices.

关 键 词：阿马蒂亚·森 约翰·罗尔斯 比较与公平正义 

分 类 号：F069.9[经济管理—政治经济学]