本地审计师的合谋效应  

The Collusion Effect of Local Auditors

作　　者：申慧慧[1] 汪泓[2] 吴联生[3] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,100070 [2]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院,310012 [3]北京大学光华管理学院,100871

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第2期83-89,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71202131);财政部"会计名家培养工程"的资助与支持

摘　　要：本文结合公司的信息不对称程度,从审计收费与审计质量的角度来研究本地审计师的合谋效应问题。研究结果表明,异常审计收费降低了本地审计师对信息不对称程度高的盈余管理公司出具非标审计意见的概率,而并不会降低本地审计师对信息不对称程度低的盈余管理公司出具非标审计意见的概率,同时,异常审计收费也不影响外地审计师出具非标审计意见的概率,表明本地审计师与信息不对称程度高的盈余管理公司之间存在合谋行为;进一步研究表明,信息不对称程度高的盈余管理公司更可能选择本地审计师进行审计,从而为本地审计师的合谋效应提供了进一步的证据。Incorporating information asymmetry level into analysis,this paper examines the collusion effect of local auditors from the perspective of both audit fee and audit quality. The paper finds out that abnormal audit fee substantially decreases local auditor's intention to issue modified audit opinion for client's with high information asymmetry,but abnormal audit fee does not affect the probability that auditor issues modified audit opinion when the auditor is nonlocal or the client's information asymmetry is low. The results suggest a collusion effect between firms with high information asymmetry and local auditors.Further study reveals that firms with high information asymmetry and high magnitude of earnings management are more inclined to choose local auditors,which provides additional support for the collusion of local auditors and these firms.

关 键 词：本地审计师 审计质量 审计收费 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]